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In Canada, there are three main sources of government-provided retirement income: the 
Canada/Quebec Pension Plans (C/QPP), which have benefits and contributions based on earnings 
up to the Yearly Maximum Pensionable Earnings; Old Age Security (OAS), which is a fixed 
amount for most but does include a ‘clawback’ of benefits for high-income individuals; and the 
Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS), which is designed to supplement those with extremely 
low income. The annual GIS benefit is reduced, or clawed back, by 50 cents for every dollar of 
annual income the person has in retirement, including C/QPP and income from Registered 
Retirement Savings Plans (RRSPs) and other savings. OAS benefits are not included in 
determining the GIS clawback.  
The result of this is that low-income individuals who attempt to enhance their retirement 
replacement ratio actually see a decrease in government-provided support the more they save for 
retirement. In fact, savings in an RRSP can effectively be taxed at more than 100% through 
corresponding reductions in the GIS, social housing, home care, GAINS (Ontario's Guaranteed 
Annual Income Supplement), and other benefits which are based on one's personal retirement 
income.  
This paper explores alternatives to the 50% GIS clawback, including: a basic GIS 
exemption, a GIS clawback rate lower than 50%, and a combination of the two. The goal is to 
improve the fairness of the GIS and reduce the disincentive to save for retirement, without 
increasing the overall cost of the program significantly. 
JEL Classification: H55 




Au Canada, il existe trois véhicules de revenus de retraite offerts par le gouvernement : la 
régie des rentes du Québec/régime de pension du Canada (RRQ/RPC) dont les prestations et 
contributions sont déterminés par le niveau des revenus jusqu'au maximum annuel des gains 
ouvrant droit à pension (MGAP); le Programme de la sécurité de la vieillesse (SV), dont le 
montant des prestations est en général fixe mais inclut également une « disposition de 
récupération » pour les individus aux revenus élevés; et le supplément de revenu garanti (SRG) 
qui assure un revenu supplémentaire aux personnes dont les revenus sont extrêmement faibles. 
Les prestations annuelles de la SRG sont réduites, ou  récupérées (clawed back), de 50% pour 
chaque dollar de revenu de retraite perçu  annuellement, incluant  RRQ/RPC et les revenus de 
Régime enregistré d'épargne-retraite (REER) ainsi que toutes autres formes d’épargnes. Les 
prestations de la  SV ne sont pas prises en compte dans le calcul de la disposition de 
récupération de la SV.  
 
Par conséquent, les personnes aux faibles revenus qui essaient d'augmenter le ratio de 
remplacement du revenu en augmentant leur épargne voient parallèlement le support provenant 
du gouvernement diminué. En effet, l'épargne placée dans un  REER peut faire face à un taux de 
taxation effectif de plus de 100% à travers les réductions correspondantes de la  SRG, de l’aide 
au logement, des soins à domicile, le RRAG (Régime de revenu annuel garanti de l'Ontario), et 
autres bénéfices déterminés par le montant des revenus de retraite.  
 
Ce papier explore une alternative au 50% de « disposition de récupération » de la  SV, 
incluant : une exemption de la SV de base, une disposition de récupération de la SV inférieure à 
50%, et une combinaison des deux. Le but est de rendre la SV plus équitable et de réduire les 
éléments dissuasifs envers l’épargne pour la retraite sans augmenter de manière significative le 
coût totale du programme.  iii 
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1.0 Introduction 
How to adequately save for retirement is a problem that every Canadian faces. How to 
ensure that the government programs that provide retirement income are both fair and solvent is 
extremely important to the Canadian government and to taxpayers. As has been stated (Brown 
[1], 2006), there are significant differences between Canada and the United States in their 
retirement income programs. In particular, the welfare benefit for extremely low-income 
Canadians is significant and bears further investigation. This report examines this portion of 
Canada’s social security.  
First, Section 2 outlines the current retirement income provided by Canadian government 
systems. Section 3 discusses the problems associated with the current GIS clawback and defines 
the assumptions in the model used to investigate mitigating alternatives analyzed in the rest of 
this report. Section 4 examines three possible alternative scenarios to the present GIS clawback: 
a basic exemption, a clawback of less than 50%, and a combination of these two.  
In Section 5, data from Statistics Canada’s Survey of Labour Income and Dynamics 
(SLID) are used to estimate the total cost of the GIS program under each of the proposed 
alternatives. Finally, section 6 provides conclusions that can be drawn from this research and 
recommendations for how to proceed.   2 
 
2.0  Retirement Income in Canada 
  In Canada, there are three main sources of government-sponsored retirement income: the 
Canada/Quebec Pension Plans (C/QPP), Old Age Security (OAS), and the Guaranteed Income 
Supplement (GIS). In addition to these sources, most Canadians also have personal savings, in 
the form of a Registered Retirement Savings Plan (RRSP), a registered employer-sponsored 
pension plan (RPP) or simply personal savings and investments. Registered plans bring 
significant tax incentives to the participant. 
 
2.1  Canada/Quebec Pension Plans 
The C/QPP pay an income-based benefit. They provide a 25% replacement rate on 
average pre-retirement earnings up to the Maximum Pensionable Earnings Average (MPEA), 
which approximates the Average Wage. The MPEA is indexed to average wages and the 2008 
value is  $42,460 annually. No benefit accrues in a year where earnings are less then the Year’s 
Basic Exemption (YBE) which is $3500 constant. (Treasury Board of Canada [7], 2008)  Thus, 
an individual's annual C/QPP benefit accrual is 
 
0 3,500
/ 0.25( ) 3,500 42,460
10,615 42,460
if income
C QPP income if income
if income
< ⎧
⎪ =≤ ≤ ⎨
⎪ > ⎩
 
 The C/QPP program is partially funded, and employees make 4.95% contributions to the 
plan, matched by employers, until they retire. 
 
2.2  Old Age Security 
OAS is a demogrant-type benefit provided to all Canadians meeting a residence 
requirement with a fixed benefit for most but a `clawback' for extremely high-income   3 
 
individuals. The maximum OAS benefit (those with 40 years of residence) as of July 2008 is 
$505.83 monthly, or $6069.96 annually. If an individual's net annual income in retirement 
(including OAS) is above $64,718, they must repay part of the OAS amount, at a clawback rate 
of 15%. Thus, the OAS benefit is eliminated entirely with a retirement income of $105,043. 
(Service Canada [4], 2008) 
 
2.3  Guaranteed Income Supplement 
The GIS is a welfare benefit designed to supplement retirees (mostly aged 65+) who have 
extremely low retirement income. The GIS benefit is clawed back at a rate of 50 cents for every 
dollar of personal annual retirement income from C/QPP and any personal savings, including 
RRSPs and RPPs, but not OAS. The July 2008 GIS benefit for a single Canadian is $638.46 
monthly or $7,661.52 annually. There are slightly different rates for married couples who are 
both pensioners, and couples where one person is a pensioner and the other is not. In these cases, 
the total retirement income from both people is used to determine the clawback amount. The GIS 
clawback ignores the first 20% of employment earnings or $500, whichever is less, which is the 
same as the deduction for employment expenses in the Canadian income tax act. (Service 
Canada [2], 2008) The fact that these exemptions refer to employment income rather than 
retirement savings means we will ignore this in the modeling. Recent changes have also been 
made to the GIS policy; these are discussed in the conclusion.   4 
 
3.0  Problems with the GIS Clawback 
The main problem with the GIS clawback is that it provides a disincentive for poorer 
Canadians to save for retirement. As Shillington ([5], 2006) notes, personal savings can be taxed 
at a rate effectively more than 100%, because so many social benefits, including GIS, depend on 
retirement income. Besides the GIS, income-tested benefits include home care, social housing, 
meals on wheels and Ontario's GAINS (Guaranteed Annual Income Supplement). Most generic 
financial literature advises Canadians to put money into their RRSPs, but for poorer Canadians, 
saving money in an RRSP is the last thing they should be doing, because they will actually lose 
more than a dollar for every dollar they have in retirement income.   
 
3.1 Model  Assumptions 
The model used to investigate alternative policies for the GIS clawback is based on some 
simplifying assumptions. All benefit rates used are those most recently available. Only 
unmarried GIS rates are considered, but the essential results would be similar for married 
couples.  
The most important and sensitive assumption is how much Canadians will save privately. 
The model assumes that Canadians who do not receive a 70% replacement ratio from 
government sources (C/QPP+OAS) will make up the difference through personal savings. That 
is, all Canadians are assumed to be aiming for a 70% replacement ratio at retirement.  
 
 
   5 
 
3.2 Current  Results 
Individually, the C/QPP, OAS, and GIS benefit amounts seem logical. Figure 1 shows the 
C/QPP benefit received based on average annual pre-retirement income in the model. Benefits 
begin when the average pre-retirement income is greater than $3500, and increase until pre-
retirement earnings reach the MPEA, $42,460. The C/QPP benefit for anyone with income over 











Figure 2 shows the same results for the OAS benefit. The benefit is level at $6069.96 
annually, until the annual pre-retirement earnings reach a high enough level that OAS clawback 
begins. This occurs at a retirement income level of $64,718, and thus, according to the model 
assumption of a target 70% replacement ratio, at a pre-retirement income level of about $92,500 
The OAS benefit is completely clawed back with a pre-retirement income of about $150,000, 
calculated similarly based on the cessation point of OAS benefits being $105,043. 
 


































































































































































































































































The graph of the GIS benefits (Figure 3) is slightly more complicated because of the 
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At pre-retirement income levels over $3500 per year, C/QPP is beginning to be paid, and 
that income is effectively taxed at 50% through the GIS clawback. Up to pre-retirement income 
of $13,000, the combined OAS and C/QPP are sufficient to provide a 70% replacement ratio, so 
the model assumes no additional savings. However, at pre-retirement income of $14,000, private 
savings begin, and the combined C/QPP and private savings are both effectively taxed at 50% 
due to the GIS clawback. This results in the change of slope seen in the graph between $13,000 
and $14,000. The GIS is quickly eliminated by the time pre-retirement earnings reach $31,000. 
Note that at this point, individuals are living on a total income of $21,700 per year, and yet do 
not qualify for the GIS welfare benefit. 
Although each benefit on its own seems to be completely logical, an interesting 
phenomenon is observed when the sum of the various government sources of income is graphed 
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Many factors can be seen easily from this graph. Canadians with pre-retirement income 
between the MPEA and $92,500 get a total of $10,615 + $6069.96 = $16,684.96 annually from 
government sources. Because of the OAS being entirely eliminated above pre-retirement income 
of $150,000, the only government-provided income for these high-income individuals would be 
the C/QPP, at the maximum benefit of $10,615. This is in contrast to retirement income systems 
such as the United States Social Security (OASDI), where the amount of government income is 
non-decreasing with respect to pre-retirement earnings.  
At the lower income levels, the C/QPP begins when the pre-retirement income is greater 
than $3500, and increases at an annual accrual rate of 25%. The GIS benefit is largest for the 
lowest incomes, decreases quickly due to the 50% clawback rate, and is completely eliminated 
for pre-retirement incomes of $31,000 and above. This is where the GIS policy, combined with 
OAS and C/QPP, results in a peculiar feature of the graph: a distinctive V-shape in total 
government-sponsored benefits in the pre-retirement income range of $13,000 to $45,000. The 
remainder of this paper investigates ways to remove or mitigate this V-shape by adjusting the 
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4.0  Possible Mitigating Alternatives 
Because the current GIS policy results in a disincentive for poorer seniors to save for 
retirement (and punishes them if they do) and because of the strange V-shape in total 
government-sponsored benefits, several mitigating alternatives are considered.  
4.1 Exempt  Income 
The GIS currently ignores the first 20% of employment earnings or $500, whichever is 
less, but this amount is not significant in reducing the disincentive to save, and it only applies to 
employment earnings. An exemption on the first $n of income from savings is considered here. 
Several values of ‘n’ were considered to try to eliminate the V-shape without excessively 
increasing the overall cost of the GIS. In addition, the model limits total government-provided 
income to no more than $16,684.96, the amount paid at higher levels of income. With GIS 
exempt income of $3500, found numerically, (which is coincidentally the same as the C/QPP 
YBE), the effect of the V-shape is slightly lessened, though not entirely eliminated, and the 
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  Looking at the GIS portion only in this scenario (Figure 6), the differences between this 
and the current policy are clear. The GIS benefit is flat for pre-retirement income levels up to 
$14,000, where C/QPP and OAS are not sufficient to provide a 70% income replacement. Then, 
with C/QPP and private savings over $3500, the GIS again reduces at a 50% rate. Here, the GIS 













This was, coincidentally, in fact the policy adopted in Bill C-50 on March 18, 2008. 
Although allowing individuals to save so that the first $3500 of their retirement savings income 
per year is excluded is a step in the right direction, the fact remains that beyond this amount, the 
clawback rate is still 50%. The V-shape cannot be eliminated with a deduction (i.e., exempt 
income), no matter how large. Thus, lowering the clawback rate itself is the next logical 
alternative to consider. 
























4.2  A Lower Clawback Rate 
  Another possibility is to have no personal exemption beyond the $500 employment 
expenses equivalent, but to have a clawback rate of x%, where x < 50. Again, several values of x 
were considered to try to eliminate the V-shape while keeping the total GIS cost as low as 
possible. Two particular values of x are discussed here: 35% and 32.5%, and each are significant 












A clawback rate of 35% is the highest rate, found numerically, that results in the total 
income provided from government sources being non-decreasing in the lower income range 
(Figure 7). Thus, the V-shape is entirely eliminated, and individuals with pre-retirement income 
ranging from $14,000 to $39,000 all receive essentially the same total amount of government 
income. This is a vast improvement over the current situation. Looking at the GIS portion alone 
in this scenario (Figure 8), the slope still changes twice – once when the C/QPP benefits start 
being paid, and again when personal savings are needed to reach 70% replacement – as with the 
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current 50% clawback rate. However, the slope is less steep, and the GIS is only entirely clawed 











With a clawback rate of 32.5%, again found numerically, the total income provided forms 
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There is a slight advantage to the 32.5% rate over the 35% alternative in that the total 
amount of funding is strictly increasing, rather than non-decreasing but constant over a range of 
incomes. However, this comes at a cost to the taxpayers of 2.5% of all private savings for low-
income Canadians (i.e. 35% – 32.5%).  The GIS income graph for this scenario (Figure 10) looks 
almost identical to that for the 35% rate, except the GIS is now completely eliminated at $43,000 













Lowering the GIS clawback rate is a much more effective way to reduce the disincentive 
to save and smooth out the total government income provided to Canadian seniors. Any 
clawback rate between 32.5% and 35% would be reasonable, since that range is where the total 
income is non-decreasing over the entire income range (not including wealthier Canadians who 
face the 15% OAS clawback). There is still one more possibility to consider: combining exempt 
income with a lower clawback rate. 
























4.3  Combination of Exempt Income and Lower Clawback Rate 
Two kinds of modifications have already been examined: a large reduction in the 
clawback rate, and a significant increase in exempt income.  Here a compromise is reached by 
performing a moderate change in both items in a single model.  If the previous models were 
simply combined (for example, $3500 exempt income and a clawback rate of 35%) the increased 
cost of the GIS would be prohibitive. Hence, it was decided that each change should be reduced 
slightly when they are combined.  
An exempt income of $2000 and a clawback rate of 40% are used in this model. An 













As it turns out, the combination is not as effective as simply lowering the clawback rate 
to 35% or 32.5%. The V-shape is still present (Figure 11), and to make the total income provided 
Figure 11: Retirement Income with $2000 GIS Exempt Income 
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by the government be non-decreasing, the total cost of the GIS would have to be higher with the 












The graph of the GIS alone in this scenario (Figure 12) shows a similar pattern to the 
pure $3500 exemption, but with a slightly less steep slope and an earlier reduction point. In this 
scenario, the GIS is eliminated at $39,000 of pre-retirement income. 
Of all the scenarios, the ones with no additional exempt income and a clawback rate of 
between 32.5% and 35% appear to be the most effective at removing the anomaly in the total 
government income graph present with today’s GIS formulation. 
Figure 12: GIS Income with $2000 GIS Exempt Income
























5.0  Cost of the GIS Program 
 
  The total cost of the GIS program is an important consideration when discussing new 
policies. Calculating the approximate total cost is not as simple as the area under the GIS curve; 
the number of Canadian retirees in each income bracket needs to be taken into account. Thus, the 







= ∑  
where nj is the number of Canadians in retirement who had pre-retirement earnings of between  
(j – 1)*($1,000) and (j)*($1,000) and GISj is the amount of GIS calculated by the model for 
income bracket j. 
5.1  Data and Methodology 
To approximate the number of Canadians in each pre-retirement income bracket, data 
from Statistics Canada’s Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics ([6], 2003) were used. This is 
a longitudinal survey of a representative sample of Canadians, conducted over several years, and 
the most recent values available were from 2003. The Person File was used, so that each entry 
corresponded to a single person, rather than a household.  
Only data for individuals who reported themselves as “retired” were considered. The pre-
retirement income for these individuals was estimated by calculating 4 times their C/QPP 
amount, since the C/QPP provides 25% income replacement, and 4 x 25% = 100%. There are 
two ranges where C/QPP is not exactly 25% of pre-retirement income. Firstly, to accrue C/QPP 
benefits requires earnings of at least $3500. Thus everyone with a pre-retirement income of less 
than $3500 annually would be counted as one bracket (with a pre-retirement income of 0) when 
C/QPP is the basis for estimating pre-retirement income. However, in this context it has no effect 
on the accuracy of the GIS costing, because all of these individuals would get the same amount  17 
 
of GIS in this model, so they can indeed be grouped together in this way. Secondly, the C/QPP 
stops increasing once the MPEA is reached, so this method would erroneously count everyone 
with a pre-retirement income of over $42,460 as one income bracket. However, the highest 
income bracket that receives any GIS in any of the four models considered is the $42,000 income 
bracket, so the amount of GIS for the over-$43,000 bracket will always be 0, and the fact that the 
bracket is so large will have no effect.  
  With the approximate number of Canadians in each income bracket, as estimated by 4 
times their C/QPP amount, the estimated cost of the GIS program can be calculated.  
5.2 Results 
First, the above method was used to calculate the approximate cost of the GIS program as 
it is administered today, to get a baseline cost. Then, the percentage increase in overall cost was 
calculated for each of the four possible mitigating solutions. The results are displayed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Percentage Increase in Overall Cost of GIS Program 
 
Alternative GIS Policy  Percentage Increase in Cost 
$3500 Exempt Income  27% 
35% Clawback Rate  24% 
32.5% Clawback Rate  30% 
$2000 Exempt Income and 40% Clawback Rate  29% 
 
Since the GIS program currently costs approximately $7 billion, it would require 
approximately another $1.7 billion to implement the 35% clawback rate, which results in a non-
decreasing total government funding for all income levels, and approximately $2.1 billion to 
reduce the clawback rate further to 32.5%. This may be considered a maximum cost, since, if 
more Canadians now decide to save for retirement, GIS costs will be reduced.  18 
 
6.0 Conclusions 
  This report examined the best way to correct the GIS system to reduce the disincentive to 
save that is present in the current GIS regime and to avoid decreasing total government-
sponsored benefits at certain income levels. By ensuring that it is always in a Canadian retiree’s 
best interest to save more for retirement, more Canadians will do so and thus be less reliant on 
government funding.  
  Lowering the clawback rate on the GIS is the simplest and most effective way to achieve 
these goals. The clawback rate can be lowered such that the total funding from government 
sources is non-decreasing with respect to pre-retirement income. The clawback rate that achieves 
this is 35% rather than the existing 50%, and the modification comes at a 24% increase to the 
current GIS cost, or an additional $1.7 billion.  
Since the submission of this article, the recent changes in GIS policy through Bill C-50 
begin to mitigate this problem. Furthermore, the introduction of the Tax-Free Savings Account 
(TFSA) will also help to remove some of the disincentive for Canadians to save. The government 
is to be congratulated for taking these steps; however, the V-shape inequity is still present, even 
with these measures in place.  
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